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TRIALS AND TRIBULATIONS:  
WHAT HAPPENS WHEN HISTORIANS 
ENTER THE COURTROOM 
DAVID ROSNER* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Four years ago, as I was sitting at my desk in my overcrowded office, I 
received an odd e-mail. “Dear Professor,” it began, 
I am writing to introduce you to Round Table Group [RTG], and to notify you of a 
specific, short-term consulting opportunity which may be of interest. Our attorney 
client is seeking an historian, highly credentialed, and at a prestigious university, to 
perform some historical research and instruct a lay jury about what was known about 
a particular occupational hazard (lead paint contamination) between 1950 and 1980.1 
The letter went on to explain how the historian sought “need not be a 
subject matter expert” but only need be a “good communicator” who could 
“easily communicate a story to a lay jury.”2 The e-mail continued in some detail, 
telling me how the process would work: If I were interested, I could send in my 
resume, a brief explanation of my expertise, and a statement of my consulting 
fee. After consulting with their industry client, I would be set up on a 
conference call to “determine if there is mutual interest in going forward.”3 The 
note continued by informing me about the consulting group: it was a consortium 
of “several thousand professors” in “management, law, medicine, science, 
computer science, education, engineering, economics, and other disciplines who 
make themselves available . . . to law firms and companies who are clients of 
Round Table Group.”4 Historians, it appeared, were a new addition to their 
stable of experts. 
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 1. E-mail from Barb Noverini to David Rosner (Jan. 13, 2005, 16:00:05 EST) (on file with author). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id.; see also Round Table Group, http://www.roundtablegroup.com/litigation/experts.cfm (last 
visited Aug. 21, 2008) (noting that the organization’s academic consultants now number over 65,000, 
including university deans and prominent professors). 
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What was ironic, if that’s the right word, was that RTG was searching for an 
expert to testify on behalf of companies in a lead-paint trial, and at that very 
moment I was preparing to testify in a major lead-paint trial on behalf of the 
State of Rhode Island.5 I, with Gerald Markowitz, had written a book on the 
lead and vinyl industries6 based on documents we had uncovered. The 
documents, an affidavit we had written, and the book had all become part of a 
landmark case in which Rhode Island’s Attorney General, along with the 
support of the plaintiffs’ law firm, Motley Rice, were suing the lead-pigment 
manufacturers to get them to remove lead paint from hundreds of thousands of 
buildings in the state. It appeared that the lead industry was searching for 
someone to testify against me. 
Clearly, this recruitment letter was part of a larger phenomenon. In recent 
years historians have been brought into legal cases in unprecedented numbers.7 
As the courts have tried to adjudicate responsibility for environmental and 
occupational diseases, history has played an increasingly central role in 
decisions that affect the cases themselves and in social policy regarding risk. In 
suits over tobacco-related diseases, asbestosis, radiation, and other toxic 
substances, more historians of technology and science, social history, and public 
health are being sought to provide testimony aimed at assessing responsibility 
for damages that have arisen years—sometimes decades—after exposure. The 
basic questions asked were predictable: Who knew what about specific toxins 
and when did they know it? Did industries understand that specific substances 
could cause disease? If so, when did they learn of the dangers and when did 
they begin to warn their workers or their consumers of their products that they 
were at risk? 
As the role of the historian has expanded, so too has the controversy 
surrounding historians’ participation. At the annual meeting of the American 
Association for the History of Medicine, traditionally a collegial conclave of 
subspecialists, a panel on the history of childhood diseases ended up in a 
shouting match after a respected historian who had been a consultant for the 
tobacco, asbestos, soft-drink, and lead industries, presented a paper arguing 
that the lead industry had done nothing wrong before the 1950s, and that, in any 
case, the problem of childhood lead poisoning was vastly overblown.8 During 
the conference the halls were abuzz with gossip and amazement, and it soon 
became apparent that many more members had been consulting for industry. 
The then-current president of the Association and Professor of Medicine and 
History at Washington University had been testifying and writing affidavits for 
 
 5. State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 2007 R.I. Super. LEXIS 32 (Feb. 26, 2007), rev’d, 951 A.2d 428 (R.I. 
2008). 
 6. GERALD MARKOWITZ & DAVID ROSNER, DECEIT AND DENIAL: THE DEADLY POLITICS OF 
INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION (2002). 
 7. See generally Robert N. Proctor, Should Medical Historians Be Working for the Tobacco 
Industry?, 363 LANCET 1174, 1174 (2004) (describing how “at least 29” historians of medicine have 
served as expert witnesses for the tobacco industry). 
 8. Patricia Cohen, History for Hire in Industry Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2003, at B7. 
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the tobacco industry for nearly fifteen years.9 Another Professor of Medicine 
and History at Duke University had worked for the tobacco industry as well as 
the lead industry throughout the 1990s;10 less well-known historians had been 
recruited by Big Tobacco and other industries.11 Some fifty-seven colleagues 
have worked for the tobacco industry alone.12 
Significantly, the origins of historians entering into liability cases originated 
with the defense bar. Efforts of the tobacco industry to recruit historians to 
testify for the industry began as early as 1987 when historian John Burnham, a 
director for “Project Cosmic,” known as Philip Morris’s “secret effort,” tried to 
convene “‘an international network of scientists and historians’ to write 
histories casting the industry in a favorable light.”13 Since at least the 1980s, the 
tobacco industry has been hiring historians to refute claims that it should have 
at least warned consumers of the dangers of their products.14 Similarly, the lead 
industry hired historians to develop its case that it had little knowledge of the 
impact of lead-paint poisoning on children until the 1950s, and that it had acted 
responsibly as soon as it found out.15 
The industry’s response to historians entering the courtroom has thus been 
fairly profound, whichever side of the controversy the historians were 
representing. Although industry law firms have been actively recruiting 
historians for some time, a smaller group of historians are being called upon to 
provide testimony concerning the responsibility of industry in undermining the 
health of U.S. citizens. Allan Brandt at Harvard worked for the federal 
government on a suit against tobacco companies.16 Robert Proctor of Stanford 
has worked on the same suit and has, in the past, testified in suits on behalf of 
women injured by radiation experiments at Vanderbilt University.17 David 
Rothman has likewise worked on the Vanderbilt case.18 Industrial hygienists 
David Ozonoff and Barry Castleman have weighed in, offering historical 
documentation on behalf of workers injured by exposure to asbestos and 
 
 9. See Robert N. Proctor, Everyone Knew But No One Had Proof: Tobacco Industry Use of 
Medical History Expertise in US Courts, 1990–2002, 363 TOBACCO CONTROL, at iv117, iv118 (2006) 
(noting that one professor’s “work for the industry dates back to August of 1988”). 
 10. Id. at iv123. 
 11. See generally id. at iv122. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at iv118. This “secret effort” was waged from 1987–1993. Id. 
 14. See generally ALLAN BRANDT, THE CIGARETTE CENTURY: THE RISE, FALL, AND DEADLY 
PERSISTENCE OF THE PRODUCT THAT DEFINED AMERICA (2007). 
 15. See, e.g., Aff. of Peter C. English, M.D., Ph.D., City of New York v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 700 
N.Y.S.2d 361 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Sept. 14, 1999) (No. 14365/89) (where English argues that until the early 
1950s, childhood lead poisoning was considered to be relatively rare in the United States in comparison 
with other poisoning and with major causes of childhood morbidity and mortality); see also, PETER C. 
ENGLISH, OLD PAINT: A MEDICAL HISTORY OF CHILDHOOD LEAD-PAINT POISONING IN THE 
UNITED STATES TO 1980 (2001). 
 16. See BRANDT, supra note 14. 
 17. Robert N. Proctor, Expert Witnesses Take the Stand, 407 NATURE 15, 15-16 (2000). 
 18. See David J. Rothman, Serving Clio and the Client: The Historian as Expert Witness, 77 BULL. 
HIST. MED. 25, 25 (2003). 
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developing historical arguments about the culpability of Johns-Manville and 
other asbestos manufacturers.19 Gerald Markowitz and I have detailed the ways 
that silicosis, lead, and vinyl production have undermined workers’ and 
consumers’ health and have testified and been deposed in silicosis, lead, and 
vinyl-chloride cases. Each of us has gone through his or her own internal, moral 
decisionmaking process in deciding whether to work for industries or for those 
injured by industries, institutions, or products. 
This article looks at the recent recruitment of historians into the world of 
toxic-tort law and examines the ways that the craft of history is used and abused 
in the legal system. It will identify the important ways that historians’ skills can 
be used on behalf of people claiming to be harmed by a variety of industries as 
well as the ways that these same skills have been used to defend industry 
activities. I do not intend to provide a dispassionate analysis of the moral, 
ethical, and legal dilemmas that confront the historian when she or he enters 
the courtroom. Nor do I mean to enter into a discussion of the problem of 
historical ambiguity and objectivity. Rather, I will integrate a scholarly as well 
as a personal perspective on the concerns that will undoubtedly deepen among 
historians. 
II 
WHY HISTORIANS? WHY NOW? 
The origins of historians’ role in these cases are rooted in the fundamental 
transformation of peoples’ health concerns and beliefs during the course of the 
past half century. For much of the first fifty years of the twentieth century, 
health concerns were dominated by the popular understanding of the causes of 
illness as being rooted in the then-emerging ideas about germs: disease was 
commonly understood to be linked directly to specific bacteria or viruses, or, 
alternatively, for the industrial worker, to specific acute exposures to a toxin.20 
Generally, the symptoms that affected the individual were understood to be 
caused by acute and specific agents—whether bacteriological or chemical—
which could be identified in the laboratory using increasingly sophisticated 
technologies.21 Tuberculosis, for example, could be understood to be “caused” 
by a bacterium, while the palsies, tremors, or wrist-drop of an industrial worker 
 
 19. See generally David Ozonoff, Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related Disease and Industrial 
Medicine, in THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF WORKERS: CASE STUDIES IN THE POLITICS OF 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 139 (Ronald Bayer ed., 1988); BARRY I. CASTLEMAN, ASBESTOS: 
MEDICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS (5th ed. 2005). 
 20. See, e.g., David Rosner & Gerald Markowitz, Safety and Health as a Class Issue: The Workers’ 
Health Bureau of America During the 1920s, in DYING FOR WORK: WORKERS’ SAFETY AND HEALTH 
IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 53, 58 (David Rosner & Gerald Markowitz eds., 1987) (describing 
the health hazards that the “growing auto industry” produced both for workers within and people living 
“far beyond the auto plants themselves”). 
 21. See JOHN HARLEY WARNER, THE THERAPEUTIC PERSPECTIVE: MEDICAL PRACTICE, 
KNOWLEDGE, AND IDENTITY IN AMERICA, 1820–1885 156–57 (1986) (noting increased usage of 
urinalyses and other chemical tests by hospitals throughout nineteenth century). 
08_ROSNER__CONTRACT PROOF_.DOC  
Winter 2009] TRIALS AND TRIBULATIONS 141 
could be identified as “caused” by exposure to lead in a battery plant or other 
industrial setting.22 
But, during the course of the twentieth century, basic public-health 
measures like improved sanitation, a purified water supply, street cleaning, and 
nutrition, among others, began to have a dramatic impact on the health of U.S. 
citizens.23 Lower rates of infant mortality and longer life spans paralleled 
improvements in environmental and engineering controls over water-borne 
diseases such as typhoid or cholera, diseases transmitted by insect vectors such 
as yellow fever or malaria, and other infectious diseases such as diphtheria, 
transmitted through the air we breathed or through person-to-person contact.24 
Further, with the development of the first sulfa drugs, antibiotics, and effective 
vaccines against polio, measles, mumps, and other childhood diseases in the 
middle decades of the century, many in the U.S. believed that the dangers from 
infectious disease were passing.25 Chronic conditions such as heart disease, 
cancer, and stroke replaced tuberculosis and other infectious diseases in the 
popular and professional imaginations as the major threats to U.S. health.26 By 
the 1970s, many in the public-health community were seeking a different model 
for understanding what caused a variety of chronic diseases.27 The very notion of 
causation was undergoing a profound transformation. 
The advent of a vibrant environmental movement fed a new paradigm for 
understanding disease.28 Chronic conditions were seen increasingly as rooted in 
the personal behavior of individuals or in the industrial–consumer world in 
which we now lived.29 The emergence of the United States as the predominant 
world economic and military power in the years after World War II fed a 
growing uneasiness about what appeared to be inequality and economic 
disparities.30 For some in the public-health community, disease was increasingly 
perceived as a signal of the inequalities and injustices brought about by the 
 
 22. DAVID ROSNER & GERALD MARKOWITZ, DEADLY DUST: SILICOSIS AND THE ON-GOING 
STRUGGLE FOR WORKERS’ HEALTH 18 (2005). 
 23. See John H. Knowles, The Responsibility of the Individual, in DOING BETTER AND FEELING 
WORSE: HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES 57, 61 (John H. Knowles ed., 1977) (noting the importance 
of these public-health measures for improving the health of U.S. citizens). 
 24. Gretchen A. Condran, Changing Patterns of Epidemic Disease in New York City, in HIVES OF 
SICKNESS: PUBLIC HEALTH AND EPIDEMICS IN NEW YORK CITY 27, 36 (David Rosner ed., 1995). 
 25. See VICTOR R. FUCHS, WHO SHALL LIVE? HEALTH, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL CHOICE 106 
(1974). 
 26. Knowles, supra note 23, at 61. 
 27. See id. (describing how accidents, lifestyle choices, and other factors may lead to chronic 
diseases). 
 28. See RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING 187–98 (1962) (exploring the effects of pesticides and 
other toxins on humans). 
 29. See FUCHS, supra note 25, at 31 (noting “the importance of ‘life-style’ and personal behavior as 
major determinants of ‘who shall live’”). See generally Knowles, supra note 23. 
 30. See generally MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA: POVERTY IN THE UNITED 
STATES (1970). 
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rampant commercialization of medicine, the poor distribution of services, and 
the inadequacies in the distribution of care.31 
If the 1950s and 1960s were a period of unbridled exuberance regarding the 
ability of industrial production to improve our lives, the late 1970s and 1980s 
brought to national attention some of the negative impacts of industrial society 
on U.S. health.32 The neighborhood of Love Canal in Niagara Falls, New York, 
was found to be polluted by the waste products of the Hooker Chemical 
Company. A whole community of lower-middle-class homeowners had to 
abandon homes as the contents of leaking barrels and waste pits upon which 
these houses were built slowly bubbled up into basements and backyards.33 At 
Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania, a nuclear plant nearly went into meltdown34 
just at the time when the film “The China Syndrome” made citizens all too 
aware of the pitfalls of nuclear energy.35 In Times Beach, Missouri, an entire 
community was evacuated and huge areas of the town roped off after it was 
discovered that dioxins, known human carcinogens, had polluted the streets of 
the town.36 In Bhopal, India, thousands of poor people were killed, blinded, and 
otherwise maimed by an explosion of a Union Carbide plant.37 Unlike the 
infectious diseases of previous eras—or even their more recent appearance in 
the form of AIDS, SARS, and anthrax—the chronic diseases and injuries that 
have come to concern us most were linked in the public mind to environmental 
and occupational exposures.38 
The growing awareness of the dangers of industrial pollution and industrial 
products more generally have fed a widespread sense that the killer diseases of 
greatest concern were produced by a variety of industrial pollutants and 
consumer goods now a mainstay of U.S. life. These goods—cigarettes, plastic 
bottles, fatty foods, and sugar-laden soft drinks, to name but a few—were no 
longer seen solely as symbols of the good life but also as culprits in the 
epidemics of lung cancer, heart disease, diabetes, obesity, and other chronic 
 
 31. SPENCER KLAW, THE GREAT AMERICAN MEDICINE SHOW: THE UNHEALTHY STATE OF U.S. 
MEDICAL CARE, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 60 (1975). 
 32. SAMUEL S. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICS OF CANCER 21 (1978). 
 33. See generally ROBERT P. WHALEN, GOVERNOR’S LOVE CANAL INTER-AGENCY TASK 
FORCE, LOVE CANAL: PUBLIC HEALTH TIME BOMB (1978). 
 34. See generally MITCHELL ROGOVIN, NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N SPECIAL INQUIRY GROUP, 
THREE MILE ISLAND: A REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONER AND TO THE PUBLIC (1980). 
 35. THE CHINA SYNDROME (IPC Films 1979) (This popular movie, starring Jane Fonda, Michael 
Douglas, and Jack Lemmon, detailed the meltdown of a nuclear reactor’s core and the attempted 
cover-up by the plant’s owners and managers. In the midst of the crisis, one of the characters utters that 
“an area the size of Pennsylvania” might become permanently uninhabitable, bringing home the fact 
that the Three Mile Island reactors were located in Pennsylvania.). 
 36. Tom Uhlenbrock, Crews Begin Cleanup of Dioxin Site; Old Truck Terminal is “Hottest” in 
Region, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 21, 1995, at 1A. 
 37. Gas Deaths in India Exceed 1,000, with Thousands Hurt; Gandhi Seeks Compensation, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 5, 1984, at A1. 
 38. See MARKOWITZ & ROSNER, supra note 6, at 211 (describing the public’s perception of 
diseases linked to vinyl-chloride exposure). 
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conditions.39 Increasingly, many diseases were seen as reflections of the world 
we had built and the environments we had created.40 
The growing concerns about the price we pay in health and well-being for 
the pleasures of our unrestrained industrial and post-industrial society has 
created new arenas in which history will play a growing and important role. 
Especially in the context of the two decades during which the regulatory 
agencies OSHA, MSHA, and the EPA have seen their powers curtailed,41 we 
can expect more and more toxic-tort cases to be brought to the courts where lay 
juries will be asked to judge responsibility for emerging consumer and 
environmental problems. 
III 
HISTORIANS IN THE COURTROOM 
It is not the case that historians are only now being called upon to testify. 
Beginning in the late 1950s with the landmark case Brown v. Board of 
Education,42 expert historical testimony has been employed in courts of law. In 
recent decades, historians have testified in a variety of civil cases: claims 
brought under the Voting Rights Act of 1965,43 water-rights disputes,44 suits 
against schools systems for proposing to teach “creation science” in 
classrooms,45 sex-discrimination lawsuits,46 libel cases brought by Holocaust 
deniers,47 and, perhaps most famously, suits against the tobacco48 and lead 
 
 39. See, e.g., MARKOWITZ & ROSNER, supra note 6, at 208–09 (identifying various consumer goods 
affected by vinyl-chloride residues, which were linked to various health problems). 
 40. See generally MARKOWITZ & ROSNER, supra note 6. 
 41. For example, since the early years of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), severe limitations 
have been placed on the activities of these two agencies. Their budgets have been slashed and OSHA in 
particular has issued few new standards. See, e.g., Steven Labaton, OSHA Leaves Worker Safety in 
Hands of Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/25/washington/25osha. 
html?_r=1. 
 42. 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (citing historian C. Vann Woodward, author of THE STRANGE CAREER OF 
JIM CROW (1957), in the decision); see also Rothman, supra note 18, at 25. 
 43. See, e.g., Press Release, Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund, AALDEF Files 
Voting Rights Act Lawsuit Against the NYC Board of Elections, available at http://www.aaldef.org/ 
articles/2006-02-06_27_AALDEFFilesVot.pdf. 
 44. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Martin, Note, Historians at the Gate: Accommodating Expert Historical 
Testimony in Federal Courts, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1518, 1519 (2003) (listing the various types of cases in 
which historians have testified). 
 45. See, e.g., S. Charles Bolton, The Historian as Expert Witness: Creationism in Arkansas, 4 PUB. 
HISTORIAN, Summer 1982, at 59, 60–67. 
 46. See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 111 F.R.D. 385 
(N.D. Ill. 1986); see also Rothman, supra note 18, at 26–27 (describing Sears as “the most controversial 
case in the 1980s that pitted historian against historian”). 
 47. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 44, at 1519. 
 48. See, e.g., Laura Maggi, Bearing Witness for Tobacco, AM. PROSPECT, Mar.–Apr. 2000, at 23 
(describing the testimony of historian Stephen Ambrose in a Louisiana lawsuit against “the big four 
tobacco companies and their lobbying arm”); see also Proctor, supra note 7. 
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industries.49 The prominence of historians in these cases has led members of the 
profession, especially those who have served as expert witnesses, to reflect in 
various articles on how expert testimony has affected the practice of history. 
These articles have first addressed that perennial “objectivity question”—
specifically, whether representing one side or another in the adversarial process 
has compromised the historian’s duty to seek historical truth. Have historians in 
these cases been pressured to distort the facts in order to win? This question, 
which has persistently dogged historians in general and legal cases in particular, 
has led to numerous exchanges in professional journals and newsletters over the 
past few years.50 Some, like Brian Martin, a historian working at History 
Associates Inc., a consulting service,51 argue that historians can remain 
dispassionate observers of historical truth, despite their participation in legal 
proceedings.52 In fact, Martin argues, the needs of the legal system to uncover 
data both useful and harmful to a client demand this dispassionate objectivity 
from historians working as consultants.53 
The idea that the courtroom corrupts the practice of history generally rests 
on the assumption that epistemological processes of history and litigation 
contradict one another, making it impossible to remain faithful to the one while 
becoming engaged in the other. J. Morgan Kousser, a California Institute of 
Technology historian who has testified in numerous voting-rights cases,54 
describes this ostensible clash of knowledge-production cultures as beginning 
with the image of the scholar’s pledge to seek and report objective truth: 
The image of the lonely scholar, or perhaps, to modernize it a bit, of the lonely 
research team, seeking truth by applying their open but careful minds to the 
appropriate evidence, is pervasive among social scientists and humanists. Scholars may 
make mistakes . . . but they don’t, goes this standard stereotype, purposely distort.55 
In contrast to this image of deliberate objectivity, the courtroom is an 
adversarial environment where lawyers “are not to pursue some abstract truth 
or social good, but only the very relative interests of the people who hire their 
 
 49. See, e.g., State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 2007 R.I. Super. LEXIS 32 (Feb. 26, 2007), rev’d, 951 A.2d 
428 (R.I. 2008). 
 50. The issue of scholarly objectivity has vexed historians for decades, well before this recent spate 
of lawsuits. In fact, it is among the oldest and most well-worn issues in the historical literature. See 
generally ROBERT NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE “OBJECTIVITY QUESTION” AND THE 
AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION (1988) (outlining the long, contentious history of battles over 
the term and its varied, politically charged uses over the course of the past century). 
 51. History Associates, Inc., is a consulting service “in historical research and writing, litigation 
research, and archives and records management” whose clients include “more than 300 corporations, 
government agencies, and professional and nonprofit organizations worldwide.” http://www.history 
associates.com/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2008). 
 52. See Brian Martin, Working with Lawyers: A Historian’s Perspective, OAH NEWSLETTER, May 
2002, http://www.oah.org/pubs/nl/2002may/Martin.html (arguing that historians risk damaging both the 
case and their integrity by testifying contrary to historical truth). 
 53. Id. (noting that attorneys must have “the most complete stories regardless of how that 
information might support or counter the client’s interests.”) 
 54. E.g., Cano v. Davis, 211 F. Supp. 2d 1208 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
 55. J. Morgan Kousser, Are Expert Witnesses Whores? Reflections on Objectivity in Scholarship and 
Expert Witnessing, 6 PUB. HISTORIAN 5, 14–15 (1984). 
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services.”56 But, contrary to corrupting historical truth, the courtroom 
encourages “an Invisible Hand [that] guides the process toward the maximum 
production of truth.”57 
For many, the way that courts and lawyers in particular use evidence and 
historical events changes the historian’s role. Columbia University historian 
David Rothman, himself an expert witness, argues that the historian should be 
involved in using his expertise in trials if the cause is just and the impact 
significant, but that the historian should recognize that whatever he or she does 
in the courtroom is something other than history.58 Arguing from his experience 
in the Vanderbilt radiation cases, Rothman observes that lawyers frame narrow 
questions for the historian to answer, and this ultimately undermines the 
historian’s autonomy and ability to cast a wide net, to contextualize or to place 
events in a deeper historical context.59 He argues that his testimony retained 
“the integrity and soundness” of his scholarship and that any additional 
research conducted in preparation for that testimony altered none of the 
findings offered in his exhibits and depositions in the Vanderbilt case. “To focus 
an inquiry,” he insists, “does not distort the results.”60 Like Kousser, he argues 
that expert witnesses “dare not contradict their prior positions[,] [for,] if they 
did, opposing counsel would immediately pounce on them.”61 
It is not accurate, says Rothman, that, as some argue, “expert witnesses are 
too committed to their side of the case to remain objective, [for] historians are 
no more or less ‘objective’ in the courtroom than they are in the lecture hall or 
in print.”62 Yet, because of the constricted nature of work in the courtroom, a 
distinction needs to be made: “To enter the courtroom is to do many things, but 
it is not to do history. The essential attributes that we treasure most about 
historical inquiry have to be left outside the door. The scope of analysis is 
narrowed, the imagination is constrained, and the curiosity, curtailed.”63 
Historians’ concern about the relationship between the legal process and the 
distortions that undermine their objectivity is revealing. After all, the same 
critique can be applied to all other disciplines and individuals who serve as 
expert witnesses. Certainly no expert practices his or her craft in a court 
setting—physicians do not practice medicine; engineers, engineering; biologists, 
biology. But because of historians’ own self-reflection, they are particularly 
concerned about the distortions the legal process might effect on their 
discipline, perhaps because part of their creed is to respect diverse opinions and 
to see historical events through many lenses. Since the 1970s, particularly with 
 
 56. Id. at 15. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Rothman, supra note 18, at 44. 
 59. Id. at 43–44 (“Lawyers . . . would find the broader issues [that historians would prefer to elicit 
both] irrelevant and inadmissible.”). 
 60. Id. at 44. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
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the growth of social history and post-modernist theory and the emphasis on 
viewing history through the lenses of women, African Americans, the working 
class, gays, and others, such issues have only magnified the discomfort of 
historians in the courtroom. Integrating the viewpoints and respecting the 
perspectives of a wide variety of social actors has become a hallmark of 
historical scholarship.64 
Attorneys have recognized this tendency to value complexity and nuance, 
sometimes at the expense of clarity and precision, and have exploited it in 
various ways. For example, lawyers for industries accused of exposing workers 
needlessly to dangerous materials, and faced with uncomfortable historical data 
(such as minutes of meetings in which the toxicity of a substance is discussed or 
other evidence of industry knowledge of harm done), argue that history is an 
implicitly subjective discipline, one lacking in a methodology that allows for 
replication of results or tests of reliability.65 Some have argued that history is not 
a science and that historians are incapable of providing “expert” opinion on par 
with the biologist, the chemist, or even the doctor.66 Yet, for the most part, such 
arguments have fallen on deaf ears, since similar arguments could be brought 
against physicians whose clinical methodologies are often the very subject of 
court cases and against other sciences whose Popperian notions of falsification 
and reliability are rarely, if ever, tested.67 One judge and historian has written, 
Historians who testify are often presented by their lawyers as paragons of objectivity, 
however, judges . . . seem to realize that there is no such thing as true objectivity. 
Ultimately, the bench looks for the same qualities [in historians as witnesses] that are 
required of all experts: appropriate specialization, thorough research, and conclusions 
that are well supported by the record.68 
In other words, it is up to the judge and jury to decide on the reliability of 
the historian–witness, just as it is up to the judge and jury to evaluate the 
testimony of experts in other fields. 
 
 64. For an extended discussion of the development of historians’ concerns over objectivity and 
subjectivity, see generally NOVICK, supra note 50. Novick worries throughout this book that our 
concerns with presenting the various perspectives of the multiplicity of historical actors and 
constituencies has led to a confusing cacophony of voices, which has undercut the cohesiveness of the 
historical narrative. 
 65. THOMAS O. MCGARITY & WENDY E. WAGNER, BENDING SCIENCE: HOW SPECIAL 
INTERESTS CORRUPT PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH 128 (2008). 
 66. See id. at 60–78 (examining ways in which industry seems to demand more from scientists who 
challenge their claims than society should be prepared to accept). 
 67. See id. Philosopher of science Karl Popper established a set of benchmarks for evaluating 
“good” science. Falsification, the process by which scientists try to disprove reported observations, is a 
central element of the scientific method. This idealized notion of how scientists establish their results as 
truths is contested. 
 68. John Neuenschwander, Historians as Expert Witnesses: The View from the Bench, OAH 
NEWSLETTER, Aug. 2002, http://www.oah.org/pubs/nl/2002aug/neuenschwander.html. 
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IV 
THE DARK SIDE: HISTORIANS CHOOSING SIDES 
The courts are both an important and a troubling arena into which 
historians are being thrust. Often bookish by nature, most historians have been 
brought up in a professional culture that reinforces individual research, often 
performed alone in archives that few others have ever visited. Although the 
image of the monastic scholar is certainly overblown, there is a grain of truth in 
such a stereotype. Scholars in the humanities and in some social sciences often 
prize individual effort in what many outside of academia might consider arcane 
subjects. Also, in the wider world of academic historians, there is a tendency to 
look with a certain skeptical eye at those who popularize, simplify, or even 
clarify complex historical events such as the Civil War or the life of Lincoln. In 
part, this reticence is due to a concern that popular renderings of complex 
historical events are necessarily superficial. But there is also an element of 
jealousy involved, for popularizers reach audiences beyond those imaginable 
for academic historians, many of whom write for tiny audiences numbering in 
the tens, or at most, hundreds.69 
In many cases historians are recruited because of their highly specialized 
knowledge. This was certainly the case when Jerry Markowitz and I first 
became involved in silicosis cases following the publication of our book about 
silicosis, nearly two decades ago.70 As historians of occupational disease, we 
knew that silicosis, a disabling lung condition caused by the inhalation of silica 
dust, had struck down thousands of workers in the decades before World War 
II. It was labeled “the king of occupational diseases” by commentators at the 
time.71 We had written our book not knowing that the disease was still of great 
concern; rather, we saw the book as of interest to labor- and medical historians, 
one that could illuminate the ways that discovery of disease was rooted in very 
special historical circumstances of economic depression, social dislocation, and 
medical change. Interestingly, we had traced the heated debates around silicosis 
that had occurred among workers, organized labor, government, and industries 
that exposed workers to silica, such as foundries, steel mills, construction, and 
sandblasting.72 Shortly after the book’s publication, we learned that the 
hardcover version of the book was in short supply and that the press was 
considering a paperback edition. How, we asked, could such a book with a 
seemingly select and, indeed, small audience be in short supply? Who had 
bought it? Its purchasers were certainly not labor- or medical historians, for the 
 
 69. Many historians have disdain for those involved in studies of recent events. 
 70. DAVID ROSNER & GERALD MARKOWITZ, DEADLY DUST: SILICOSIS AND THE POLITICS OF 
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA (1991). This book was recently updated and 
republished as DAVID ROSNER & GERALD MARKOWITZ, DEADLY DUST: SILICOSIS AND THE ON-
GOING STRUGGLE FOR WORKERS’ HEALTH (2005). 
 71. See ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 22, at 75–104. 
 72. Id. at 13–104. 
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subject was narrow and out of the mainstream of concerns for most scholars in 
these sub-disciplines. 
After a cursory investigation, the publisher discovered that the book was 
being bought by law firms. Soon, we were being called by firms all over the 
country, asking us to consult with them about their cases. It appeared that 
workers in a host of industries—primarily in Texas, Louisiana, and other Gulf 
states—were still coming down with silicosis and were suing a variety of 
suppliers for negligence.73 We were asked if we might testify about the historical 
understanding of the disease and about what industry leaders themselves knew 
of the dangers to workers associated with inhaling silica among sandblasters, 
foundry work, granite cutting and polishing, and a host of other jobs we had 
written about. 
At first, we were hesitant to get involved. It seemed repellent to us to testify 
in court, to appear at depositions, and to subject ourselves to possible pressures 
to meet the demands of courtrooms. We were scholars, not interested parties; 
we were removed from the events of the day by training and inclination, and 
were not in the business of testifying, at least not in court. Memories of the 
contentiousness that affected the historical profession following the 
engagement of two of our colleagues on different sides of the EEOC v. Sears74 
case in the 1980s made us especially wary of getting involved. 
Yet, after one lawyer came to New York and presented the haunting story 
of one of her clients, we changed our minds. She told of her client, a thirty-four-
year-old Mexican worker who had learned of a relatively lucrative job in the oil 
fields of west Texas. In the 1970s, following the OPEC oil crisis, when west 
Texas crude was once again in demand, a huge oil company had contracted to 
have sandblasters come clean out old oil-storage tanks. The company had 
shipped hundreds of Mexican workers to the area around Odessa, Texas, had 
given them paper “3M” masks and a sandblasting unit, and had had them enter 
small, enclosed tanks and blast sand at the layers of tar and oil that had 
accumulated on the tanks over the decades. Not surprisingly, several years later, 
workers began to die, suffocating from silicosis caused by the inhalation of 
finely ground silica dust that had slowly destroyed their lungs.75 
It was clear our book could be important in providing financial relief to 
some of these workers and their families. In court cases the industry had been 
arguing successfully that since virtually “no one” had ever heard of silicosis, “no 
one” could be held accountable for a disease that was unexpectedly killing 
workers. Our book offered evidence to directly contradict the central tenet of 
these arguments: we had documented in minute detail what was medically 
 
 73. David Rosner & Gerald E. Markowitz, From Dust to Dust: The Birth and Re-Birth of National 
Concern about Silicosis, in ILLNESS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 162, 170 (Steve Kroll-Smith, Phil Brown 
& Valerie J. Gunter eds., 2000). 
 74. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 111 F.R.D. 385 (N.D. Ill. 
1986). 
 75. ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 22, at 222–24. 
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known about the disease in the early twentieth century and the industry’s 
actions when faced by major lawsuits in the 1930s and after.76 We had 
documented that the industry had known of the disease as early as the 1910s.77 
We agreed to become “expert witnesses” in two cases. 
Whereas our book on silicosis preceded our experience with the legal 
system, our next book on industrial pollution grew out of another lawsuit. In 
1996 we were called by two lawyers from the City of New York Law 
Department. It appeared that the City had been sued by some families whose 
children had been injured by lead contained in the paint of some of the city’s 
public housing. The city, in turn, had begun a suit against the lead industry, 
claiming that the industry bore some responsibility for injuries to these children. 
Over a number of years the city had accumulated a moderate-sized roomful of 
documents that were drawn largely from the Lead Industries Association, the 
trade association for manufacturers of lead paint and other lead-bearing 
products. What, the city wanted to know, was in these hundreds of thousands of 
pages it had accumulated? 
The city had contacted us because of an article we had published in 1985 on 
the controversies around lead poisoning;78 we were therefore among, perhaps 
the only, historians that had ever studied the industry in any depth. In that 
article we traced the history of the controversies around lead poisoning due to 
automobile exhaust.79 Coming as it did while the EPA was determining whether 
to demand that the industry remove lead from gasoline once and for all, the 
article had caused a bit of a stir in the public-health community, even provoking 
an editorial from the Journal apologizing for its role sixty years before in 
creating such a public-health tragedy. 
We were asked to evaluate the roomful of material the city had received 
through the discovery phase of the trial. That material became the first part of 
our book Deceit and Denial: The Deadly Politics of Industrial Pollution.80 This 
book, an analysis of the role of industry in creating a public-health tragedy, 
could not have been possible without litigation, which freed up literally 
hundreds of thousands of pages of company documents. In fact, without the 
cases, historians would never have seen internal memos and minutes of 
meetings in which company representatives from the Dutch Boy or Sherwin 
Williams companies, among others, discussed among themselves the dangers 
that leaded paint posed to children as early as the late 1920s.81 Nor would we 
have been able to learn of marketing campaigns aimed at counteracting public 
 
 76. See generally ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 22. 
 77. See generally id. 
 78. David Rosner & Gerald Markowitz, “A Gift of God”? The Public Health Controversy over 
Leaded Gasoline During the 1920s, 75 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 344 (1985). 
 79. See id. 
 80. MARKOWITZ & ROSNER, supra note 6. 
 81. See id. at 64–107. 
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concerns over the dangers of lead—ads claiming lead paint was safe and 
sanitary and useful on children’s walls, furniture, and the like.82 
The documents divulged through the lead-paint and related lawsuits gave us 
a new perspective on the history of this terrible public-health tragedy. The 
immediate result of our work with the documents was a long affidavit that 
became part of the New York City case and that was quickly integrated into 
numerous other legal actions underway around the country by the end of 2002, 
brought by Chicago, New York, Buffalo, San Francisco, St. Louis, Milwaukee, 
and other cities. Some of these were quickly dismissed by judges, but others 
were allowed to go forward.83 
The first state action against the lead industry was brought by the Attorney 
General of Rhode Island, alleging that the industry had knowingly created a 
public nuisance by using lead paint on the walls of up to eighty percent of the 
state’s housing, thereby putting thousands of children at risk of developing lead 
poisoning.84 The trial was intense, but it let the jury see for itself documents that 
demonstrated the industry’s knowledge of childhood lead poisoning going back 
a century.85 The power of the documents was impressive, and the jury found for 
the state, ultimately ordering the lead-pigment manufacturers to “abate” the 
lead hazard throughout Rhode Island.86 The potential cost for cleaning up the 
State of Rhode Island is immense, as estimates range from $1 to $4 billion.87 
Most recently, however, the Rhode Island Supreme Court undid years of 
litigation when it overturned the jury verdict, reasoning that the case had been 
brought to court under the wrong law.88 
 
 82. Id. 
 83. See, e.g., County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313 (Ct. App. 2006) 
(listing various cases from around the country); Ryan J. Foley, Milwaukee Loses Appeal in Lead Paint 
Lawsuit, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 25, 2008, http://archives.chicagotribune.com/2008/nov/25/local/chi-ap-wi-
leadpaint; Chicago's Suit Over Lead Paint Dismissed, LEAD POISONING NEWS, Oct. 8, 2003, http:// 
www.lead-poisoning-news.com/articles/illinois.html. 
 84. See State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 2007 R.I. Super. LEXIS 32 (Feb. 26, 2007), rev’d, 951 A.2d 428 
(R.I. 2008). 
 85. Id. 
 86. See State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 434–35, 40 (R.I. 2008) (reciting case history). That 
verdict was upheld on appeal and the judge in the case rejected the defense’s plea to overturn the 
verdict, writing a 197-page decision in which he often referred to the historical record as presented by 
myself and Dr. Markowitz. Peter Lord, Judge Refuses to Overthrow Lead-Paint Conviction, 
PROVIDENCE J., Feb. 27, 2007, at A1, A6. But on July 1, 2008, the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
overturned the jury verdict in a stunning decision. See Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d at 435 (reversing 
most of the appellate ruling). 
 87. Immediately after the case was settled the stock market responded to the verdict by forcing 
Sherwin Williams stock to plunge and BUSINESS WEEK announced that “Estimates on Lead Paint 
Clean-Up Soar.” Michelle Smith, Estimates on Lead Paint Clean-Up Soar, BUSINESS WEEK ONLINE, 
Mar. 26, 2007, http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D8O42J401.htm. Although the legal 
maneuvering by the industry to delay the jury verdict continues, BLOOMBERG.COM announced that in 
light of the Rhode Island decision the Attorney General of Ohio has initiated a similar suit. Jef Feeley, 
Sherwin-Williams, DuPont Sued by Ohio Over Lead Paint, BLOOMBERG.COM, Apr. 3, 2007, http:// 
www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=email_en&refer=&sid=aQb5ogfWCWQk. 
 88. See Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d at 455–59 (holding that the defendants’ actions were not 
cognizable as a public nuisance, but suggesting that they might sound in products-liability law). 
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The second part of the book detailed records we had gone through 
regarding the vinyl-chloride misnomer and what the industry knew about its 
potential dangers.89 It was this portion of the book that taught us a big lesson 
that we are only now beginning to analyze and understand. Around 1998 we 
had been asked if we would be willing to take a look at an enormous store of 
company documents from the chemical industry that had been turned over 
during the course of an ongoing lawsuit concerning a vinyl-chloride worker 
dying from angiosarcoma of the liver.90 We were asked by the plaintiffs’ lawyers 
to help evaluate what was in this store of materials and whether there was 
reason to believe the chemical industry had acted knowingly regarding these 
workers’ safety.91 Our efforts with these records resulted in a three-hundred-
page timeline of knowledge and activities by the Chemical Manufacturers 
Association that has become the basis for a number of lawsuits against the 
industry.92 
V 
DEFENDANTS DISCREDIT PLAINTIFF’S HISTORIANS AND HIRE THEIR OWN 
EXPERTS: WHO KNEW WHAT, WHEN, AND DID IT MATTER? 
Throughout the nation, toxic-tort cases are leading companies to seek their 
own historian–experts to argue that the companies bear no responsibility for a 
host of conditions that appear associated with exposure to implants, asbestos, 
pharmaceuticals, and the like. Tobacco, mining, paint, plastics, and chemical 
companies have begun to hire historians to use their skills in what some critics 
have called an effort to obscure and to confuse the historical record about 
responsibility, knowledge, and risk.93 In some sense, the role of historians of 
medicine and science, some argue, has been to create confusion rather than to 
illuminate history.94 
Although many historians have decided to enter the fray on behalf of 
injured parties,95 others have been hired by tobacco, lead, and other industries 
as “experts” to defend the actions of a variety of companies.96 These historians 
have often sought to “contextualize” unseemly past activities including the 
 
 89. See generally MARKOWITZ & ROSNER, supra note 6. 
 90. Angiosarcoma of the liver is extremely rare, occurring in as few as two dozen people in the 
United States in any given year. Nicholas J. Vianna, Judith Brady, Philip Harper, Angiosarcoma of the 
Liver: A Signal Lesion of Vinyl Chloride Exposure, 41 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 207, 207 (1981). 
 91. We travelled to Lake Charles, Louisiana on a number of occasions to review documents and 
identify those that we needed copied and shipped back to us in New York. 
 92. The timeline is available at http://www.deceitanddenial.org/docs/timeline.pdf. Dr. Markowitz 
has agreed to testify and has been deposed but, for a number of personal reasons, I have not 
participated in the cases. 
 93. See generally Rothman, supra note 18 (arguing to the contrary that “historians can serve clients 
without subverting the canons of the discipline [of history]”). 
 94. DAVID MICHAELS, DOUBT IS THEIR PRODUCT: HOW INDUSTRY’S ASSAULT ON SCIENCE 
THREATENS YOUR HEALTH 9 (2008). 
 95. See, e.g., Proctor, supra note 7, at 1175. 
 96. Id. 
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knowing, direct sale or marketing of tobacco, lead, and other toxins to children, 
despite industry knowledge about their dangers.97 Historians of great and lesser 
renown have used their expertise and prestige on behalf of lead and tobacco98 or 
for industries in a host of other toxic-tort suits.99 
How, then, can we begin to evaluate the place of the historian in the 
courtroom? First, we might ask what the basis for the historian’s testimony is. 
Nathan Schachtman, a defense attorney in toxic-tort cases, argues that whatever 
the historian can do, the lawyer can do better, or at least as well.100 In his 
depiction, historians are little more than presenters of abstracted data that 
Schachtman calls “facts”—dates, documents, statements, events.101 As such, 
there is little reason for considering them experts.102 
But the historian’s skills include an ability to contextualize, to weave 
together and make sense out of many discrete pieces of information that, alone, 
usually contain ambiguous and unintelligible random facts. By placing such 
facts in a broader historical context and drawing from a variety of sources both 
directly and indirectly related to the subject, the historian takes what may seem 
to be idiosyncratic events and makes them intelligible, part of a continuous 
stream of information that reveals infinitely more than any one document can 
possibly reveal. Hence, the skilled historian can take many documents and tie 
them together or take a single document and make it intelligible. Obviously, 
recent twentieth-century historians often have a huge store of information to 
work with, summarize, and contextualize,103 whereas a medievalist might have 
only a single primary document, such as an illuminated manuscript, with which 
to work. But both have the ability to draw out meaning, whether through the 
words, pictures, or sounds in the document itself or from the events and 
literature that the document itself speaks to. 
In contrast, attorneys, as often as not, see the historical record very 
differently: they attempt to find discrete documents that either “tell the whole 
story”—“smoking guns,” so to speak—or that reveal the true intent or 
knowledge of individuals. When asked for “one or a handful of documents that 
tell it all,” I have to explain the complexity of historical narratives. Certainly, 
some individual documents can, and do, stand on their own. But more typically 
it is the accretion of information, the development of knowledge, the sequential 
accumulation of meetings, minutes, advertisements, scientific, or medical 
 
 97. Id. 
 98. See Proctor, supra note 9, at iv118. 
 99. See id. at iv122. 
 100. See Nathan Schachtman, On Deadly Dust and Histrionic Historians: Preliminary Thoughts of 
History and Historians as Expert Witnesses in Products Liability Cases, in MEALEY’S LITIGATION 
REPORT: SILICA 1 (2003) (arguing that trial lawyers try cases by the same “researching, documenting 
and adducing evidence of historical fact” that historians do). 
 101. Id. at 2. 
 102. See id. at 1–2 (arguing that historians’ claims cannot be proven by “admissible evidence,” and 
that lawyers can argue anything that a historian could bring up). 
 103. See, e.g., supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
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articles, speeches, and more, that require explanation by historians trained in 
piecing together necessarily incomplete historical materials. 
Historians are sensitive to the incomplete nature of the historical record. 
Records are, from the historian’s perspective, never complete. This does not 
mean historians can never reach conclusions, but it does mean that—within 
limits—there are reasonable, differing ways to interpret data. We could not say 
that someone “really knew” that she was making false statements, misleading 
the public, or lying to others, for we cannot give a lie-detector test to the 
historical figure. For the historian, the accumulation of data, of information, 
allows limited statements. We can “know” that company representatives were 
present at a string of meetings when childhood lead poisoning was discussed, 
but were they paying attention? Were they out of the room when these issues 
were discussed? What was going through their minds when they interjected a 
statement into the record? Were they completely out to lunch except when their 
own words are specifically mentioned in the transcript of a meeting? Were they 
full participants? 
For the lawyer, such acknowledgement of gaps in the historical record 
amounts to uncertainty and is useful in creating doubt and discontinuity. The 
very complexity of history often provides openings to create ambiguity or even 
to undermine the historian’s craft. A skilled lawyer can present the world as a 
series of discrete events and, when interested in undermining testimony, can 
often disconnect, rather than connect, the dots. The ambiguity or limited scope 
of a particular piece of information will become the means of dividing and 
decontextualizing the historical record, leaving the argument disassembled, in 
pieces, incomprehensible. 
To illustrate, during one of my depositions in the Rhode Island lead suit, I 
had presented a listing of the times in the 1930s when the Lead Industries 
Association had talked about lead poisoning and childhood lead poisoning in 
particular. The statements in the industry-association minutes seemed clear 
enough, coming, as they were, after many hours of discussion of the early 
twentieth-century medical literature on childhood lead poisoning (from 
children nibbling on lead-painted toys, cribs, woodwork, et cetera) and 
numerous mentions in trade and other publications of lead poisoning (among 
workers, including children working in lead-pigment-manufacturing plants), 
movements to ban the use of lead by twenty-one countries, and numerous 
others instances identifying lead pigment as a “deadly, cumulative poison,” 
whose use should be banned or limited to the outdoors. Those collecting data, 
providing information to the public about lead, and systematically following all 
that affected the market for their product, could not reasonably claim, we 
believed, to know nothing at all about the evidence pouring out.104 We could 
understand the industry-trade-association minutes’ proclaiming that lead 
 
 104. For a summary of the available documentary materials, see ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra 
note 6. 
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poisoning consumed immense amounts of the association’s time as meaning 
that the industry was unquestionably aware of the issue, no less than when the 
association’s annual meetings reported on “Lead Poisoning.”105 
From my perspective, there was little question that one could connect the 
dots, most of which, for a historian, were the size of stains. But this was not the 
case for all, as illustrated when the lawyer for one of the companies sought to 
separate each statement, to identify the gaps in knowledge rather than the 
continuities. Noting that the annual-meeting minutes mentioned lead poisoning 
in general over a number of years without identifying “childhood” lead 
poisoning in particular, the lawyer asked me whether it was possible that the 
industry just “wasn’t aware” or “didn’t know” that childhood lead poisoning 
was an issue in those years. Was it possible that by this question these lawyers 
thought the issue “resolved?” 
In a related splitting of epistemological hairs, the historian is also sometimes 
asked if he or she can “really know what’s in a person’s mind.” One lawyer, for 
example, faced with letters saying that a physician had been visited by the trade-
association head to dissuade him of his belief that lead was poisoning children 
in Baltimore, wanted me to “admit” that the head of the trade association might 
really have “believed” that lead was not really a problem: 
Lawyer: Do you have any evidence that Mr. Wormser [the secretary of the trade 
association] was other than sincere in his stated views that lead toxicity was 
exaggerated in the public press? 
I: Other than sincere? 
Lawyer: Yes. Do you have any evidence that he did not believe the things he was 
saying? 
I: (How does one answer that question?) Well, I’m certainly not in his mind. It seems 
very odd that a man who lived through this entire period, and who had access to the 
kind of information he had access to, and who continually sought to calm 
apprehension and had enormous amounts of information surrounding him, did not 
suspect that there might be a problem here. . . . 
Lawyer: (But did I “know” that he “knew,” understood, believed differently?) 
I: (I had to “admit” that.) Whether he’s sincere, I just don’t know. . . . I have no idea 
how to get to the soul of that man.106 
Asking the expert witness, a historian, what he knows about what the 
defendant knows, in his soul, is as absurd as it sounds. 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. Deposition of David Rosner at 35–36, Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc, (No. 99-5226) 
(July 6, 2005) (from vol. III, videotaped at the law offices of Arnold & Porter, N.Y., N.Y.). 
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VI 
FROM “HOW CAN THE HISTORIAN KNOW WHAT INDUSTRY KNEW?” TO 
“HOW CAN ANYONE KNOW ANYTHING”? 
When faced with the client’s evidence that industry representatives tried to 
influence doctors to reverse themselves regarding diagnoses, to influence 
legislators to stop regulations that might inhibit the use of lead paint, or to prod 
school and other officials to buy lead paint, a lawyer for the industry might 
argue that, despite that evidence, there is no reason to suspect that the industry 
representative was “successful” in changing behavior. 
I was specifically asked, 
Lawyer: Do you have any evidence of any doctor being visited who withheld 
information or changed [his or her] opinion? 
I: No . . . I don’t have any writing that says “I changed my opinions on the basis of this 
person’s decision or this person’s visit.” 
Lawyer: You also don’t have any LIA [Lead Industry Association] document 
indicating that they changed anyone’s mind, do you? 
I: Well, we have a number of LIA documents in which Wormser claims that he’s 
changed [the] opinions of numerous people, from state legislators, to people writing 
warning labels, to physicians who[m] he felt visits to were very profitable . . . . 
Lawyer: [But do you “know” he changed peoples’ minds?] 
I: [No.] I don’t have any writing that that says “I changed my opinions on the basis of 
this person’s decision or this person’s visit.”107 
The point of the exchange was to get me to state that the actions of the 
industry, no matter how reprehensible, might not have had any effect 
whatsoever and to show that the historical evidence of the industry’s efforts to 
shape the outcome through mass advertising as well as through visits to doctors, 
legislators, and administrators was irrelevant to the legal proceedings. Further, 
the questioning was aimed at undermining any affirmative answer I might give 
regarding the defendants’ intent or what they understood regarding the dangers 
of their product. 
The ambiguity of the historical record can work to the advantage of 
industries not only in its lawyers’ attempts to undermine the testimony of the 
plaintiffs’ historians. In fact, instances of historians emphasizing the difficulties 
of making historical judgments in the context of testimony for both sides 
abound. Philip Scranton, for example, a historian of business and technology at 
Rutgers,108 was hired by lawyers for the asbestos industry to write a timeline of 
 
 107. Id. at 28. 
 108. Scranton also wrote and signed the chemical industry’s attack on my colleague Gerald 
Markowitz and myself. For a complete transcript of his attack on us, reviews of our book, and our 
response to his attack, see www.deceitanddenial.org. In addition, we provide a link to nearly 20,000 
documents that were the basis for much of our research in the parts of our book that he attacked. 
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important events from the 1930s through the 1960s.109 He gave depositions in 
which he literally argued that the knowledge of others is itself difficult to 
discern, if ever even attainable.110 In nine pages of his deposition, he outlined an 
arbitrary set of events in the history of technology that he deemed worthy of 
inclusion, none of which mentioned asbestos or asbestos-related disease.111 I can 
only guess at the purpose for including him as a witness in a case regarding 
asbestos exposure, other than to illustrate that people had many other things on 
their minds than disease in the period between the Depression and the 1960s. 
But at the deposition, the questioning by plaintiffs’ lawyers took an 
interesting turn. Scranton was asked whether he had an opinion about whether 
a company should have warned workers about their knowledge regarding the 
dangers of asbestos exposure in the 1930s. To this he gave a long answer 
regarding what it meant to “know” something in science.112 Before definitive 
statements could be made, he argued, information had to be tested, confirmed, 
retested, and subjected to years of examination.113 So even if the company said 
something in 1936 indicating it “understood” that asbestos could injure the 
workforce, this was something different from “knowing” it was dangerous; the 
company therefore had no responsibility to inform the workers of information 
that it was not sure of.114 “The problem with the question,” Scranton began, 
is the ambiguity about what “‘knowing’” means. . . . In the history of science and 
technology, there are multiple stages of knowing before action in sort of a grand sense 
can be taken. You can know, for example, that there’s a problem. And when a 
problem is identified, multiple participants will assess the severity of the problem, 
trying to figure out how bad it is. They’ll disagree. And after a period of time, some 
kind of consensus comes about the challenges this problem presents. And then there’s 
a problem that has to be addressed about how to measure it, and that goes through a 
series of discussions among scientists or technologists and engineers. And there are a 
lot of proposals about how to measure the issue that’s at hand. And after some work 
on that front and some agreement or at least debate about terms of measurements, 
scientists and engineers and technologists focus on what will fix the problem, and that 
involves a period of work because it’s not obvious, often, what will fix the problem, 
and there are a whole bunch of proposals for that. And then after another period of 
time, some kind of consensus is reached on figuring out how to get the problem fixed. 
All of those are stages of knowing, one after another.115 
Such a process can take years, even decades, and apparently, in the 
intervening period of time, Scranton seemed to be saying, there was no 
responsibility to warn. Obviously, historians have no trouble making their 
testimony obscure. 
 
 109. See Deposition of Philip Scranton, In re W. Va. Asbestos Litig., No. 02-C-9004 (Cir. Ct. 
Kanawha Cty., W. Va.). 
 110. See, e.g., id. 
 111. For example, he identifies a series of technological events from atomic bomb through the 
launching of satellites as examples of the types of issues (other than asbestos) the broader population 
was paying attention to. See id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 33–34. 
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So historians have been valuable in lawsuits to obscure the past, as well as to 
illuminate it. It appears that the legal strategies of the law firms have been more 
or less the same, following a common pattern and a common rationale. David 
Michaels has argued that one of industry’s goals in civil actions is to produce 
uncertainty and doubt about the reliability of scientific information.116 Historian 
Robert Proctor has coined the term “agnatology,” to describe a new “science” 
for the creation of historical doubt and ignorance about actions in the past.117 
Proctor, Michaels, and more recently, Allan Brandt, Gerald Markowitz, and I 
argue that lawyers for the tobacco, lead, and asbestos industries, among others, 
appear to have adopted a few basic techniques that promote these goals. In 
general, these lawyers have argued that (1) whatever the evidence that 
industries had past knowledge of a product’s dangers, any information was 
insufficient to definitively prove real danger; so (2) more research was always 
needed before doubt could be eliminated, and questioning that a material was 
dangerous meant that there was a “controversy” about whether it was; (3) 
causation is extremely difficult to prove and requires years, if not decades, of 
careful experimentation and observation in order to quiet any “controversy” 
about the sources of disease. (4) Hence, without certainty, and in the context of 
any ongoing controversy about the danger of a product or substance, industries 
are under little or no obligation to remove their products from the market or to 
lower exposures to toxic materials within the factory. 
Industry’s argument about our book, our depositions, and our testimony in 
vinyl, lead, and silica cases, closely parallels this structure: 
1. There was always a reason to gather more and more information before 
telling government, workers, or the public of the possibility that a 
substance was carcinogenic in humans at low doses. 
2. Science is a slow, cumulative process that demands that information 
about danger not be revealed until scientific proof exists and after 
“controversy” over that proof is laid to rest. 
3. Industry always had valid reason to doubt the accuracy of any finding of 
carcinogenesis. 
4. History is a complex process in which clarity is rare and confusion the 
norm. 
5. Historians who draw conclusions indicating industry malfeasance are 
sloppy, simplistic or biased. 
6. Objectivity” in historical analysis requires that 
a. equal weight of plausibility be provided to all sides in an 
argument and that no judgments be made, and 
b. even disinformation, including all self-serving statements, be 
presented as legitimate. 
 
 116. MICHAELS, supra note 94, at 9. 
 117. Proctor, supra note 9, at iv118. 
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7. Every conflicting piece of information should be reported, irrespective 
of its importance to the historical questions being asked. 
8. Incomplete knowledge is equivalent to controversy about that 
knowledge. 
9. One should ignore evidence of responsibility in favor of evidence of 
ambiguity or innocence. 
10. Positive peer reviews or post-publication reviews are invalid unless the 
reviewers have read all the primary documents. 
11. Any sign of “presentism”118 is bad, except when it exonerates the 
industry. 
12. When all else fails, quibble endlessly about adjectives, nouns, or adverbs 
used to describe or summarize corporate behavior, then seek to 
sidetrack arguments and raise phony issues. 
Industries are playing on our professional propensity to see complexity and 
ambiguity in human events. 
VII 
WHY HISTORIANS IN THE COURTROOM? 
In this context, it is important to recognize the growing demand for the 
historian’s skills. We may be dragged kicking and screaming into moral 
dilemmas in which we are forced to determine the boundaries of our 
involvement in public disputes. In part, this will be an unwelcome circumstance. 
Yet we owe society a great deal and we owe those who are often without voice a 
great deal more. The demands from the legal system will force us to crystallize 
our sense of purpose and the humanistic traditions that lend legitimacy to our 
field. A greater relevance and involvement of historians will force us to define 
what is “good” history, both methodologically as well as morally. 
 
 
 118. “Presentism” refers to historians’ work that addresses, or is influenced by, questions emerging 
from contemporary problems or issues. Some see this style as an intrusion on the “objectivity” of the 
historian, as it often imposes on the past modern questions that may or may not have been issues then. 
See generally NOVICK, supra note 50; DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, HISTORIANS’ FALLACIES: TOWARD 
A LOGIC OF HISTORICAL THOUGHT (1970). 
